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The Industrialization of Agriculture and its  
Consequences for the Natural Environment: 
An Inter-German Comparative Perspective 
Arnd Bauerkämper∗ 
Abstract: Both German states saw a major trend towards 
agricultural modernization after 1945, though to a different 
extent. Likewise, the environmental consequences of indus-
trialized agriculture were remarkably similar in both coun-
tries. However, the Federal Republic and the GDR differed 
in both the extent of the environmental hazards and the ap-
proach towards abatement. In the GDR, an open discussion 
of the environmental problems of industrialized agriculture 
was almost nonexistent. In the 1970s and 1980s, the eutro-
phication of surface water and the contamination of ground-
water with fertilizers and pesticides increased significantly, 
as did the compression of the soil due to heavy machinery 
and water and wind erosion. However, the East German 
government suppressed an open discussion of the environ-
mental impact of large agricultural production units. In con-
trast, these consequences were discussed openly in the Fed-
eral Republic; the intensive, specialized animal production 
in northwestern Lower Saxony provides an example. How-
ever, environmental activists did not achieve limited correc-
tions of the general policy of agricultural modernization un-
til the 1980s, with traditions of agricultural modernization 
remaining stronger in East Germany than in the West. 
 
In the wake of the BSE crisis that shook Germany in 2000 and 2001, historian 
Wolfram Pyta characterized the general situation of rural communities as fol-
lows: “Satellite dishes have taken the place of the weathercock on top of the 
church steeple. The small town has lost the smell of cow and horse manure and 
now embraces the exhalations of high-powered vehicles. Against this back-
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ground, actual farmers make for an almost folkloristic addition – and their 
work seems to have totally lost the charming touch of being rooted in nature 
and the land.”1 In the industrial countries of the twentieth century, the derurali-
zation of the countryside went hand in hand with a progressive dissolution of 
natural cycles in agricultural production. More generally, deruralization was 
part of an overarching process that Josef Mooser has referred to as “deagrariza-
tion”, meaning that agriculture was more and more subordinated to the general 
interests of industrial society in general and mass consumption in particular.2 
The result was a fundamental “transformation of the goals of agricultural pol-
icy from a protectionist policy in the interest of the producers to a nutrition-
oriented consumer policy.”3 At the same time, industrialized agriculture has 
had an ever-increasing impact on the natural environment in all industrialized 
countries since the 1950s. However, these consequences of industrialized agri-
cultural production were not the subject of intensive discussion in the Federal 
Republic of Germany until the 1970s. In the German Democratic Republic, 
political pressure prevented an open discussion of these environmental hazards 
until the revolution of 1989.4 
In both German states, environmental problems were the result of an exces-
sive – in the case of the GDR, even hypertrophied – policy of industrializing 
agriculture. Thus, this article needs to consider political concepts and measures 
as well as the changes of agriculture and rural society which they induced. 
After some general remarks on the tensions between agricultural modernization 
and environmentally friendly agricultural production, this contribution deals 
with the consequences of the collectivization of agriculture in the GDR and the 
transformation of farm structures in the Federal Republic of Germany in the 
1950s and early 1960s. In the following chapters, the article analyses the accel-
erated transition to agro-industrial complexes since the mid-1960s. The general 
aim is to describe, by way of an asymmetric comparison with the Federal Re-
public, the specifics of the megalomaniac agricultural policy of the GDR and 
its consequences for the natural environment. 5 This approach is based on the 
                                                 
1  Wolfram Pyta, “Bauern, Brauchtum, BSE,” Die Zeit no. 5 (January 25, 2001), p. 9. On the 
disastrous impact of BSE on Britain, see Alun Hawkins, The Death of Rural England. A 
Social History of the Countryside since 1900 (London, 2003), pp. 218-227. 
2  Josef Mooser, “Das Verschwinden der Bauern. Überlegungen zur Sozialgeschichte der 
‘Entagrarisierung’ und Modernisierung der Landwirtschaft im 20. Jahrhundert,” Daniela 
Münkel (ed.), Der lange Abschied vom Agrarland. Agrarpolitik, Landwirtschaft und ländli-
che Gesellschaft zwischen Weimar und Bonn (Göttingen, 2000), pp. 23-35; Josef Mooser, 
“Kommentar,” Matthias Frese, Michael Prinz (eds.), Politische Zäsuren und gesell-
schaftlicher Wandel im 20. Jahrhundert (Paderborn, 1996), pp. 393-398; Josef Mooser, 
“Wir sind so hungrig,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung no. 17 (January 20, 2001), p. II. 
3  Mooser, “Kommentar”, p. 393 
4  Cf. Volker Klemm, Korruption und Amtsmißbrauch in der DDR (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 170, 
172. 
5  On the methodology of asymmetric comparisons, see Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical His-
torical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg,” History and Theory 38 (1999), 
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general methodological postulate to enrich historiographic inquiries on the 
GDR by a comparative discussion of the Federal Republic in order to identify 
general characteristics of modern industrial societies as well as East German 
specifics.6 Linkages deserve some attention as well, as “interconnection and de-
limitation”7 or “delimitation within interconnection”8 are typical of develop-
ments in both German states. 
1. Agricultural Policy in the Two German States: The 
General Context 
With the frontline of the cold war running between the Federal Republic and 
the GDR, agricultural policy was inevitably part of a general pattern of political 
and communicative demarcation in both German states. The two opposing go-
vernments claimed to pursue a policy of modernization that was superior both 
economically and socially. In West Germany, a land reform failed partially, 
though not solely, as a result of foreign objections. While the Western Allies 
had favored a land reform as a matter of principle during the first years of oc-
cupation, they changed their minds as a result of food shortages and the escala-
tion of the cold war, with the rigorous confiscation and redistribution of land in 
East Germany providing an alarming precedent. The wholesale confiscation of 
property without compensation obviously violated fundamental principles of 
the rule of law, even more so since the owners could not effectively raise an 
objection. At the same time, the significant economic burden of the land reform 
confirmed the doubts of West German critics within the conservative parties 
                                                                                                      
pp. 40-50; p. 49, as a response to Thomas Welskopp, “Stolpersteine auf dem Königsweg. 
Methodenkritische Anmerkungen zum internationalen Vergleich in der Gesellschaftsge-
schichte,” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 35 (1995), pp. 339-367; pp. 357-359, 365. 
6  Cf. Hartmut Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahr-
hundert (Frankfurt, 1999), pp. 26-35, 44n; Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, Jürgen Kocka, “His-
torischer Vergleich: Methoden, Aufgaben, Probleme. Eine Einleitung,” Haupt, Kocka 
(eds.), Geschichte und Vergleich. Aufsätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender 
Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt, 1996), pp. 9-45; pp. 11-13, 15n. 
7  Christoph Kleßmann, “Verflechtung und Abgrenzung. Aspekte der geteilten und zusam-
mengehörigen deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 29/30 
(July 16, 1993), pp. 30-41. 
8  Arnd Bauerkämper, Martin Sabrow, Bernd Stöver, “Einleitung. Die doppelte deutsche 
Zeitgeschichte,” Bauerkämper et al (eds.), Doppelte Zeitgeschichte. Deutsch-deutsche Be-
ziehungen 1945-1990. Fs. Christoph Kleßmann (Bonn, 1998), pp. 9-16; p. 13. Cf. also Lutz 
Niethammer, “Methodische Überlegungen zur deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte. Doppel-
geschichte, Nationalgeschichte oder aymmetrisch verflochtene Parallelgeschichte?” Chris-
toph Kleßmann, Hans Misselwitz, Günter Wichert (eds.), Deutsche Vergangenheiten – eine 
gemeinsame Herausforderung. Der schwierige Umgang mit der doppelten Nachkriegs-
geschichte (Berlin, 1999), pp. 307-327. 
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and the farmers’ associations. As a result, the redistribution of agricultural land 
disappeared from the political agenda in West Germany.9 
Since the 1950s, the key issues in the inter-German agricultural dispute were 
collectivization in the GDR and the transformation of farm structures in the 
Federal Republic. Both countries charged each other with “the expropriation of 
peasants’ land” (Bauernlegen), an allusion to the confiscation of peasant prop-
erty by feudal landowners in early modern Germany that was meant to dele-
gitimize the other side’s policy. These mutual attacks provide a prime example 
of how both sides were intrinsically tied to each other. “Delimitation within in-
terconnection”10 became a key feature of the inter-German discourse, not only 
in the field of agriculture. Characteristically, the decision of the East German 
Volkskammer (the token parliament of the GDR) of April 25, 1960, which 
marked the official end of collectivization, was phrased as the farmers’ pledge 
of allegiance to the GDR and as an act of resistance towards the structural 
changes under way in the Federal Republic: “The transition of all GDR farmers 
to co-operative production is truly a plebiscite for peace, progress, and social-
ism, against nuclear armament, militarism, and preparation for war in West 
Germany, and for a solution of the German question. At the same time, it is a 
sharp protest of our farmers against the Federal Republic’s agricultural policy 
with its strong anti-farming bias and the Bauernlegen in West Germany.”11 At 
                                                 
9  Arnd Bauerkämper, “Legitimation durch Abgrenzung. Interpretationen der Bodenreform 
und Kollektivierung im Kontext der deutschen Teilung und Vereinigung,” Beiträge zur Ge-
schichte der Arbeiterbewegung 38 (1996), no. 4, pp. 36-69; pp. 36-39; Kleßmann, “Ver-
flechtung”, p. 34; on the plans for land reform in the American zone, see Ulrich Enders, 
Die Bodenreform in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone 1945-1949 unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung Bayerns (Ostfildern, 1982); on the British zone, see Günter J. Trittel, 
“Das Scheitern der Bodenreform im ‘Schatten des Hungers’,” Josef Foschepoth, Rolf 
Steininger (eds.), Die britische Deutschland- und Besatzungspolitik 1945-1949 (Paderborn, 
1985), pp. 153-170; Günter J. Trittel, “’Siedlung’ statt ‘Bodenreform’. Die Erhaltung der 
Agrarstruktur in Westdeutschland (1948/49),” Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrar-
soziologie 27 (1979), pp. 181-207; Günter J. Trittel, “Die Bodenreform – ein Beitrag der 
Besatzungsmächte zur gesellschaftlichen Strukturreform Nachkriegsdeutschlands 1945-
1949,” Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie 30 (1982), pp. 28-47; Wilfried 
Feldenkirchen, “Agrarpolitik im Nachkriegsdeutschland: Leitbilder und Ziele der 
deutschen Politiker, Parteien und Interessenvertretungen,” Hans-Jürgen Gerhard (ed.), 
Struktur und Dimension. Fs. Karl Heinrich Kaufhold (vol. 2, Stuttgart, 1997), pp. 266-291; 
pp. 270, 275n, 285, 289. 
10  Bauerkämper et al, “Einleitung,” p. 15. 
11  Walter Ulbricht, Die Bauernbefreiung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Vol. 2: 
Juli 1958 – Dezember 1960 (Berlin [East], 1962), p. 1161. On the resolution of the Volk-
skammer, see Siegfried Kuntsche, “Die Umgestaltung der Eigentumsverhältnisse und der 
Produktionsstruktur in der Landwirtschaft,” Dietmar Keller et al (eds.), Ansichten zur Ge-
schichte der DDR. Vol. 1 (Bonn, 1993), pp. 191-210; p. 204. On the protest of bishops, see 
Ulrich Mählert, Kleine Geschichte der DDR (Munich, 1998), p. 94n. Also see Christel 
Nehrig, “Im Osten propagiert, im Westen diffamiert. Die Kollektivierung der Land-
wirtschaft in der DDR,” Unsere Medien – Unsere Republik 2. Edited by Adolf-Grimme-
Institut, issue 3 (1992), pp. 14-16; p. 14; and Bauerkämper, “Legitimation”, pp. 64n. 
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the same time, West German politicians were voicing a very similar critique of 
the GDR’s agricultural policy, while West Germany, after the passage of the 
seminal Farm Act (Landwirtschaftsgesetz) of 1955 and the conferences of 
Messina in the same year and Venice in 1956, was hesitantly moving towards a 
consolidation of agricultural policy within the European Economic Community 
(EEC). For example, Carlo Schmid, a prominent member of the Social Democ-
ratic Party and president of the West German parliament, attacked the forced 
collectivization in the GDR in an official declaration of April 6, 1960, as a 
“new Bauernlegen.” In West Germany, collectivization was flatly perceived as 
a “Sovietization,” thus fueling anticommunist sentiments.12 Up to the 1980s, 
agricultural policy was a key component of modernist discourses in both states, 
with both claiming to pursue the right path in the transformation of agriculture. 
This general context provides an explanation for the enduring prominence of 
the family farm as a model in West Germany even while the family farm was 
constantly eroding in practice. It also explains the enduring sympathy for large 
agro-industrial collectives in the East in spite of a growing realization that they 
were both economically dysfunctional and, as internal studies showed, ex-
tremely hazardous to the natural environment. 
2. Utopias of Agricultural Modernization and the Goal of 
a Reliable Food Supply 
Far-reaching claims to power and visions of near-omnipotence were hallmarks 
of the agricultural policy of the GDR. Thus, the writer Erich Loest described 
the situation as follows, “Some agricultural commanders (Landwirtschaftsbe-
fehlshaber) had dozens of villages under their command. Their empire ended 
only with the horizon, and on their territory, they moved brigades back and 
forth, and when one of them had one thousand cattle in the barn, the next one 
                                                 
12  Cf. Ulrich Kluge, Vierzig Jahre Agrarpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vol. 1 
(Hamburg, 1989), pp. S. 227-236; Die Vernichtung des selbständigen Bauernstandes in der 
Sowjetzone. Eine Dokumentarschau im Auftrage des Bundesministeriums für ge-
samtdeutsche Fragen, zusammengestellt vom Büro Bonner Berichte (Bonn, 1964); Die 
Zwangskollektivierung des selbständigen Bauernstandes in Mitteldeutschland, hg. vom 
Bundesministerium für Gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Bonn, 1960) (quotation pp. 7n); Adolf 
Weber, “Umgestaltung der Eigentumsverhältnisse und der Produktionsstruktur in der Land-
wirtschaft der DDR,” Materialien der Enquete-Kommission „Aufarbeitung der Geschichte 
und Folgen der SED-Diktatur in Deutschland“ (12. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundesta-
ges). Hg. vom Deutschen Bundestag. Vol. II/4: Machtstrukturen und Entscheidungsmecha-
nismen im SED-Staat und die Frage der Verantwortung (Baden-Baden, 1995), pp. 2809-
2888; pp. 2868, 2870. On the Federal Republic and the EEC, see Ulrich Kluge, “Wege eu-
ropäischer Agrarintegration 1950-1957,” Ludolf Herbst et al (eds.), Vom Marshallplan zur 
EWG. Die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt (Munich, 
1990), pp. 301-311. 
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was seeking to trump him with five thousand, and another one with ten thou-
sand cattle.”13 The unrestrained voluntarism and technicism of Stalinist dicta-
torships left a marked imprint on the industrialization of agriculture in the 
GDR, as did the enduring Cold-War conflict with the Federal Republic. Begin-
ning in the Soviet Union in the early 1930s, Stalinism aimed at a conditioning 
of the natural environment in light of the demands of the “new man” and com-
munist society. In spite of obvious links to the ambivalence of modernity and 
the “hubris of internal and external usurpation of authority (Weltbemächti-
gung),” this attitude implied a peculiarly strong aggressive potential.14 Adora-
tion of science, techno-euphoria and rational planning were inherent in Marxist 
thought, and these became even more pronounced in Stalinism, culminating in 
an ideology of forced modernization that defined universal industrialization as 
a precondition of progress.15 Even more, the goal was to annihilate the contrast 
between city and country, already identified by Karl Marx as an important 
dimension of social inequality.16 Leading state and party officials in the GDR 
hoped to create equal living conditions in city and country through a condition-
ing of nature and a housing policy that was as extensive as it was reckless.17 
The government’s unrestrained voluntarism and belief in progress found its 
expression in the doctrine of “class warfare” that was directed not only against 
political enemies but also against nature. Natural obstacles thus became objects 
of Stalinist policy. The claim to manipulate nature went hand in hand with a 
cult of modernity that implied both a humanization of nature and a naturaliza-
tion of societal and political conflicts.18 Soviet agricultural policy still echoed 
this ideology in the 1950s with oversized irrigation projects and a reckless ex-
ploitation of the soil, the use of pesticides and fertilizers, and campaigns for the 
cultivation of cotton and corn. Situated on the frontline of the Cold War, the 
GDR was prominently exposed to the appeal of the economic success of the 
Federal Republic since the 1950s, making the guarantee of a reliable food 
                                                 
13  Erich Loest, Der Zorn des Schafes. Aus meinem Tagewerk (Munich, 1993 [1st edition 
Künzelsau, 1990]), p. 23. 
14  Detlev J.K. Peukert, “Das Janusgesicht der Moderne,” Peukert, Max Webers Diagnose der 
Moderne (Göttingen, 1989), pp. 55-69, 132n; p. 68. Also see Zygmunt Bauman, Moderne 
und Ambivalenz. Das Ende der Eindeutigkeit (Hamburg, 1992), esp. pp. 45, 55, 69, 320-
326, 343; Zygmunt Bauman, Unbehagen in der Postmoderne (Hamburg, 1999), esp. pp. 
18, 27. 
15  Dieter Langewiesche, “Fortschritt als sozialistische Hoffnung,” Klaus Schönhoven, Diet-
rich Staritz (eds.), Sozialismus und Kommunismus im Wandel. Hermann Weber zum 65. 
Geburtstag (Cologne, 1993), pp. 39-55. 
16  Cf. Ingeborg Tömmel, Der Gegensatz von Stadt und Land im realen Sozialismus. Repro-
duktion kapitalistisch geprägter Industriestrukturen durch Planwirtschaft in der DDR (Kas-
sel, 1980), pp. 30-118. 
17  Cf. Andreas Dix, “Freies Land”. Siedlungsplanung im ländlichen Raum der SBZ und 
frühen DDR 1945-1955 (Cologne, 2002). 
18  Klaus Gestwa, “Technik als Kultur der Zukunft. Der Kult um die ‘Stalinschen Großbauten 
des Kommunismus’,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 30 (2004), pp. 37-73; pp. 43-45. 
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supply a prominent goal of GDR policy. The contrast between socialist central 
planning in the East and the market economy in the West was an important 
dimension of the inter-German rivalry, and securing a food supply of good 
quality was a way to buy loyalty to the political system in both countries, espe-
cially during the 1960s.19 
It is only in the last few years that the transformation of agricultural struc-
tures after 1945 has received significant popular attention. Most prominently, a 
number of recent food scandals – as, for example, the controversy over grain 
tainted with the poisonous chemical Nitrofen in the summer of 2002 – provided 
powerful demonstrations of the hazards of industrial agriculture for consumers 
and the natural environment. The widespread notion of independent, tradition-
oriented peasants in the quiet, secluded countryside had always been something 
of a cliché, but with the post-war transformation of agriculture, it became al-
most completely obsolete.20 
In the immediate post-war years, the issue of food scarcity dominated agri-
cultural policy in both German states. A collective experience that evoked 
memories of the food scarcity of the First World War and its aftermath21, hun-
ger had to be fought and vanquished, and a reliably supply of food secured.22 
The post-war “rationed society”23 with its unequal access to farming products 
gave birth to sharp social conflicts, and the antagonism between food producers 
and consumers reflected a sharp clash between city and country.24 Aside from 
                                                 
19  Cf. Winfried Halder, Deutsche Teilung. Vorgeschichte und Anfangsjahre der doppelten 
Staatsgründung (Zürich, 2002), pp. 139-160; Dierk Hoffmann, Die DDR unter Ulbricht. 
Gewaltsame Neuordnung und gescheiterte Modernisierung (Zürich, 2003), pp. 157-174, 
196-200. 
20  Cf. Heinz Haushofer, “Die Idealvorstellung vom deutschen Bauern,” Zeitschrift für Agrar-
geschichte und Agrarsoziologie 26 (1978), pp. 147-160; Joachim Ziche, “Historische 
Relikte in der Vorstellungswelt der bäuerlichen Bevölkerung,” Zeitschrift für Agrar-
geschichte und Agrarsoziologie 19 (1970), pp. 221-229. 
21  Robert G. Moeller, “Dimension of Social Conflict in the Great War: The View from the 
German Countryside,” Central European History 14 (1981), pp. 142-168; Robert G. Moel-
ler, German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914-1924. The Rhineland and Westphalia 
(Chapel Hill, 1986), pp. 43-159, 208-239; Robert G. Moeller, “Economic Dimension of 
Peasant Protest in the Transition from Kaiserreich to Weimar,” Moeller (ed.), Peasants and 
Lords in Modern Germany. Recent Studies in Agricultural History (London, 1986), pp. 
140-167; pp. 152-155, 161; Jonathan Osmond, “Peasant Farming in South and West Ger-
many during War and Inflation 1914 to 1924: Stability or Stagnation?” Gerald D. Feldman 
et al (eds.), Die deutsche Inflation. Eine Zwischenbilanz (Berlin, 1982), pp. 289-307; pp. 
290-294, 305. 
22  Günter J. Trittel, Hunger und Politik. Die Ernährungskrise in der Bizone (1945-1949) 
(Frankfurt, 1990); Günter J. Trittel, “Die westlichen Besatzungsmächte und der Kampf ge-
gen den Mangel 1945-1949,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 22 (May 31, 1986), pp. 18-
29. 
23  Rainer Gries, Die Rationen-Gesellschaft. Versorgungskampf und Vergleichsmentalität: 
Leipzig, München und Köln nach dem Kriege (Münster, 1991). 
24  Paul Erker, “Hunger und sozialer Konflikt in der Nachkriegszeit,” Manfred Gailus, Hein-
rich Volkmann (eds.), Der Kampf um das tägliche Brot. Nahrungsmangel, Versorgungs-
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food support from the Allied powers, it was only a quick and significant in-
crease of agricultural production that could mitigate this critical situation. 
Therefore, both parts of Germany adhered to the production principle after the 
Second World War, the traditional pillar of German agricultural policy.25 In 
fact, the cold war gave birth to a race for the abolition of rationing and a better 
food supply between the Federal Republic and the GDR; and that, again, re-
quired an increase in agricultural production. With the long-term trend of mi-
gration from country to city being interrupted only briefly during the early 
post-war years, a significant growth of both per-acre and per-worker productiv-
ity was the order of the day. With that, the trend towards large, rationalized 
production was set.26 To be sure, the paths towards industrialized agriculture 
differed significantly in both German states as a result of divergent political 
and economic conditions. Specifically, there was no West German equivalent 
to the GDR’s agricultural giantism. Finally, agriculture remained stronger in 
the GDR than in the Federal Republic if we look at prominent indicators like 
the percentage of agricultural workers in the total workforce. However, the 
general trend in the transformation of agriculture and rural society was re-
markably similar in both countries. Rationalization of work routines, against 
the background of an intensified and mechanized production, led to a signifi-
cant increase of productivity, even though this took place less rapidly and com-
prehensively in the GDR. At the same time, farmers left a steadily decreasing 
imprint on social structures and social relations in the villages.27 
                                                                                                      
politik und Protest 1770-1990 (Opladen, 1994), pp. 392-408; Günter J. Trittel, “Hun-
gerkrise und kollektiver Protest in Westdeutschland (1945-1949)”, Gailus, Volkmann, 
Kampf, pp. 377-391; Gustavo Corni, “Markt, Politik und Staat in der Landwirtschaft. Ein 
Vergleich zwischen Deutschland und Italien im 20. Jahrhundert,” Zeitschrift für Agrar-
geschichte und Agrarsoziologie 51 (2003), pp. 62-77; p. 70. 
25  Karl Eckart, Agrargeographie Deutschlands. Agrarraum und Agrarwirtschaft Deutschlands 
im 20. Jahrhundert (Gotha, 1998), pp. 174-179. 
26  Werner Plumpe, “Wirtschaftsstruktur und Strukturwandel: Landwirtschaft,” Gerold Am-
brosius, Dietmar Petzina, Werner Plumpe (eds.), Moderne Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Eine Ein-
führung für Historiker und Ökonomen (Munich, 1996), pp. 193-215; p. 203; Friedrich-
Wilhelm Henning, Landwirtschaft und ländliche Gesellschaft in Deutschland. Vol. 2. 1750 
bis 1976 (Paderborn, 1978), pp. 229-232, 249-251, 254-262. 
27  Arnd Bauerkämper, “Agrarwirtschaft und ländliche Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland und DDR,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 38 (September 12, 1997), pp. 25-
37; pp. 29-34. For a more general perspective, see Bernd Faulenbach, “’Modernisierung’ in 
der Bundesrepublik und in der DDR während der 60er Jahre,” Zeitgeschichte 25 (1998), 
pp. 282-294, esp. p. 291. 
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3. The Collectivization of Agriculture in the GDR and 
Structural Change in West German Agriculture until the 
Early 1960s 
In both German states, agricultural modernization was characterized by a tech-
nocratic voluntarism, a penchant for technology, and a high regard for the state 
as an agent of change. In the GDR, this situation was amplified by the illusion 
that central planning could direct economic and social transformation and in 
the process create a completely new, “socialist” society. Far-reaching miscon-
ceptions of their own powers were part of this exaggerated vision of moderni-
zation, and so was the notion that the preconditions of agricultural production, 
including nature, could be changed almost deliberately in accordance with the 
needs of industrialized farming. In both German states, conventional wisdom 
had it that modernization was basically synonymous with an uninterrupted, 
uniform progress towards industrial society. However, in the case of the GDR, 
Soviet influences played an important role that fostered a careless use of the 
soil, with the campaign for corn production in the 1950s providing a fitting 
example.28 
In the 1950s, agricultural modernization meant a whole set of parallel trans-
formations in production in both countries. First, the intensity of production 
increased enormously, due primarily to the growing use of pesticides and min-
eral fertilizers. As a result, per-acre and per-worker productivity grew consid-
erably; however, the farmers also lost their traditional bond with the soil in the 
process. Second, agricultural production became capital-intensive, especially in 
the Federal Republic. Generally, increasing investments of capital and energy 
took the place of human labor in agricultural production. Third, mechanization 
fundamentally changed work routines on the farm and likewise led to a massive 
increase of productivity. In the Federal Republic, the number of tractors dou-
bled annually between 1950 and 1960. In the GDR, mechanization largely 
proceeded at a slower path than in the West, but the general trend was re-
markably similar. Fourth, concentration of production within large units led to 
a fundamentally new structure of agricultural production, though this concen-
tration did not take places as abruptly in the Federal Republic as in the GDR. 
However, the change in employment patterns was more radical in the Federal 
Republic, where many full-time farmers chose to transform their businesses 
into part-time enterprises in the wake of the growing disparity of income. Fifth, 
specialization of agricultural production started in the 1950s, at first without 
completely disrupting the natural circle of animal and plant production. A total 
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separation of these branches of production did not emerge until the 1960s and 
1970s, with this process taking place more comprehensively in the GDR than 
in the Federal Republic, where it was mostly confined to livestock breeding.29 
It is important to consider the consequences of agricultural modernization 
from at least two perspectives. To consumers, the transformation of agricultural 
production appeared as an overwhelming success story at first glance. In both 
German states, a secure supply of food contrasted nicely with hunger and star-
vation in the immediate post-war years. However, the hazards of an agricultural 
modernization driven almost exclusively by economic criteria became clear in 
the Federal Republic when discussions started over the ecological conse-
quences of intensive agricultural production in the late 1970s. Similar problems 
of industrialized agricultural production emerged in the GDR, but those con-
cerned about them could not discuss them publicly.30 
West German farmers were under enormous pressure in the 1950s to react to 
the government’s changing needs and priorities. To be sure, the farm lobby was 
still strong enough to ensure state regulation that protected agricultural produc-
tion to some extent from the vagaries of the world economy. However, it 
lacked effective means to stop the transformation of agricultural structures, and 
the general subordination of agricultural interests under those of industrial 
society in general.31 With that, the “end of the German farmers question”32 was 
approaching. 
While the “farm deaths” (Höfesterben) were accummulating in the Federal 
Republic, collectivization robbed farmers of control over their property in the 
GDR. West German farmers likewise experienced a profound loss of status as 
their freedom to adjust production and work to their liking was shrinking rap-
idly. Separation from their means of production grew incessantly as farmers 
gradually became “specialist workers in public service.”33 In the GDR, agricul-
tural policy degraded farmers to dependent workers in the Agricultural Produc-
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tion Collectives (Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften [LPG]). In 
both states, agricultural policy was no longer directed towards the producers 
but rather towards the consumers of agricultural products. In the GDR, the use 
of pesticides and fertilizers did not increase as rapidly as in the Federal Repub-
lic in the 1950s. As a result, it was not until 1956/57 that the use of chemicals 
was again reaching the pre-war level of 1938/39.34 Nevertheless, it was possi-
ble to improve the food supply and to suspend successively all rationing of 
food until 1958. However, East German agriculture remained generally iso-
lated, while West Germany’s export-oriented industry was a strong proponent 
of free trade during the 1950s. The renunciation of the production principle 
devaluated the farmers’ work, and in the long run, farmers turned into “welfare 
recipients.”35 To a growing extent, they drew their income from donations from 
the general public, and no longer from the proceeds of their own work. Acting 
as “stewards of the land,” they nowadays perform a “public service,” or even an 
“office.”36 
Following up on studies in agricultural sociology, more recent historiogra-
phy stresses that farmers in both German states were not simply passive objects 
of agricultural policy and victims of modernization. Quite the contrary, it needs 
to be emphasized that farmers made creative use of agricultural policy and the 
economic conditions in rural society.37 In the Federal Republic, they took an 
active role in the expansion of the industrial economy that was driving the 
economic boom. Farmers who abandoned agricultural production or turned to 
part-time production increased the industrial workforce while at the same time 
permitting the development of strong and productive farms through leasing or 
(less frequently) sale of land.38 In general, West German farmers made clever 
use of rationalization and modernization and often managed to defend their 
own interests. However, one should not ignore in the wake of this general pic-
ture that reorientation towards non-farm labor was in most cases an economic 
necessity, and not a free choice.39 
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In the GDR, members of the LPGs were likewise using the remaining room 
to maneuver. When political pressure increased notably in the late 1950s, farm-
ers preferred to unite with other productive farmers to LPGs of type I, where 
the cultivation of land took place exclusively on a collective basis. LPGs of 
type I differed markedly from LPGs of type III, where land, machinery, build-
ings, and livestock all came under one comprehensive management; usually, 
these LPGs were formed by former farm workers or industrial workers, while 
LPGs of type I were popular among established farmers. After their forced 
integration into LPGs, formerly independent farmers often sought to preserve 
some remnants of a private economy. However, farm traditions, with the cus-
tomary pattern of inheritance at their core, inevitably ended in the GDR in the 
1960s. What was more, East German farmers, unlike their Western counter-
parts, were no longer the owners of their means of production, as command 
over land, livestock, and equipment was now in the hands of the LPG.40 
The transformation of agricultural production did not lead to a complete loss 
of the rural in either German state, as many farmers, while accepting jobs out-
side of agriculture, pursued farming on a part-time basis. Usually, they com-
muted, facilitated by the motorization of the Federal Republic since the 1950s. 
Many former farmers, acting as “worker-farmers (Arbeiterbauern)”, kept their 
place of residence in small rural communities.41 This was also possible in the 
GDR both for farmers who joined the LPGs and for those who sought jobs in 
other fields. They concentrated their energies on the remaining private land 
(with cultivation bringing significant proceeds in some cases), or turned to 
garden work. Rural bonds were particularly strong in the southern part of the 
GDR, where these traditions and smallholder structures stayed alive even in 
collectives. Social relations and associations preserved rural traditions even 
after collectivization.42 
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However, West and East German agriculture differed not only in the struc-
tures and forms of property but also in the general pattern of agricultural work. 
Between 1950 and 1965, non-family labor on West German farms decreased by 
more than 60 percent. Wage labor gradually disappeared from the West Ger-
man farm economy, which once again strengthened the family farm. As a result 
of the loss of non-family labor, farmers had to recruit family members to run 
operations. Women frequently preserved the farm tradition when men accepted 
jobs outside of agriculture.43 This pattern differed markedly from that in the 
GDR, where LPGs still embraced a significantly larger workforce after the 
1950s. In addition, collectives offered jobs not only in production but also in 
repair shops and social services, in contrast to West German production units. 
Until the final years of the GDR, there was a notable labor surplus on East 
German farms in comparison with the Federal Republic. 
In general, family farm structures remained intact during the 1950s even in 
the face of rapid structural change. In contrast to the GDR, family farms were 
preserved as the institutional foundation of rural culture in West Germany until 
the 1960s.44 However, in the following three decades, the family farm col-
lapsed. The mechanization and capitalization of work processes, the persistent 
exodus from farming, and general transformations in society, such as the wid-
ening generation gap and changes in lifestyles, undermined the family farm. 
Nevertheless, it persisted as a model of West German agricultural policy, with 
its sharp demarcation from the collectivized agriculture in the East. In practice, 
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however, the family farm, with its idealized vision of free peasants on their 
own property, was growing into a complete fiction.45 
4. “Socialist Modernity” and its Consequences for the 
Natural Environment. The Transition to Industrialized 
Agriculture since the 1960s 
In the 1960s, the East German government sought to foster the industrialization 
of agriculture through the combination of farms into larger units. The following 
remarks intend to outline this process and then compare it briefly with the 
parallel, though dissimilar developments in the Federal Republic. At its Fifth 
Party Convention in July of 1958, the ruling SED decided “to exceed West 
German agriculture in per-acre yields of all cultures and in the production of 
meat, milk, and eggs during the third Five Year Plan [i.e., until 1963].” It was a 
culmination of the East German government’s utopias of modernization that 
combined economic growth with the creation of a harmonious “socialist com-
munity of people.”46 During the following two decades, an almost unlimited 
confidence in science and technology (as evident in the programmatic talk of 
“industrial agricultural production”) went hand in hand with the unrestricted 
belief that man could alter nature to its pleasure.47 
At the Sixth Party Convention in January, 1963, East German leaders pro-
claimed that the state party’s key goals in agriculture were “the continued in-
tensification and the gradual transition towards industrial methods of produc-
tion.”48 The decisions of the Seventh Party Convention in April 1967, as well 
as those of the Tenth Farmers’ Congress in June, 1968, intensified this policy 
even more; now, the rallying cries were the transition towards industrial meth-
ods of production and “socialist intensification” in agriculture.49 After the 
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original plans to create large LPGs had stalled in the early 1960s, the political 
goal was a new type of cooperative production units.50 In the mid-1960s, LPGs 
won more autonomy of decision-making in the wake of the Neues Ökono-
misches System der Planung und Leitung (NÖSPL), but towards the end of the 
decade, the government shifted once again with a new wave of state interven-
tions. 
The general aim of “socialist intensification” was an increase of agricultural 
production and of the productivity of both workers and land. The conservation 
of nature and the protection of the natural environment were clearly subordi-
nate to this overarching goal. For example, the agricultural act of 1970 (Lan-
deskulturgesetz) outlined the primacy of rational planning and the aim to use 
landscapes and nature.51 Moreover, the concept of agro-industrial production 
aimed at the creation of a uniform and homogeneous group of LPG farmers 
with interests and mentalities close to that of industrial workers, pursuant to the 
ideal of an egalitarian “socialist community of men.”52 In this way, the gov-
ernment sought to create equal living conditions in city and country – a goal 
that the SED did not abandon until November, 1981, when it announced to ev-
erybody’s surprise that “villages remain villages, and peasants remain peas-
ants.”53 
The general trend towards vertical integration comprised four distinct proc-
esses. First, since the late 1960s, the East German government urged the crea-
tion of cooperatives that would provide for coordination between separate 
LPGs and a more balanced load for large machinery. Around 1970, large agri-
cultural businesses called Cooperative Units Plant Production (Kooperative 
Abteilungen Pflanzenproduktion [KAP]) came into being. These included on 
average some 4,000 hectares of land as early as 1974, fourteen times the aver-
age size of an LPG in 1960. 1,200 KAPs gave work to more than 261,000 
employees by 1974, cultivating 74 percent of the arable land in the GDR.54 
New inter-collective units also drove forward processes of integration and 
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fusion in livestock breeding.55 Second, the trend was to externalize preliminary 
work and services for agricultural production into newly formed inter-
collective units. For example, centers for agro-chemistry (Agrochemische Zen-
tren) took over responsibility for fertilizer and pesticide application, and repair 
work was concentrated in District Concerns for Agricultural Implements 
(Kreisbetriebe für Landtechnik). Likewise, melioration work was delegated to 
special businesses that each took care of several “People-Owned Estates” 
(Volkseigene Güter [VEG]), LPGs or KAPs. In plant production, these agro-
businesses cooperated with service centers on a daily basis.56 
Third, the East German government pushed towards vertical integration by 
linking agricultural enterprises with processing enterprises. Specifically, it 
forced the collectives to enter contracts with processing plants for a steadily 
increasing range of products. Therefore, institutionalized cooperative associa-
tions emerged by the late 1960s for quality meat, milk, grain, potatoes, fruits, 
and vegetables.57 Fourth, officials ordered the creation of state-owned busi-
nesses outside the cooperative model since the late 1960s. Specifically, meat 
production took place more and more in plants of an industrial character, e.g. in 
Combines for Industrial Mast (Kombinate für Industrielle Mast [KIM]) for the 
production of pork and poultry.58 In the GDR as in West Germany, the increas-
ing production of poultry mirrored changes in lifestyles and patterns of con-
sumption. However, the KIMs were also driving forces in the intensification 
and rationalization of egg production.59 
The so-called “Grüneberg-Plan” of 1977/78 (named after the Central Com-
mittee’s Secretary of Agriculture from 1960 to 1981, Gerhard Grüneberg) 
implied a forced separation of plant and animal production, and amplified once 
more the environmental hazards of agricultural production in East Germany. 
With the creation of specialized units for plant production and livestock breed-
ing, the “Grüneberg-Plan” was the culmination of the giantism of East German 
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agricultural policy, and it should be noted that the plan met with resistance 
among many subordinate functionaries. In 1983, LPGs and VEGs specializing 
in plant production were cultivating 4,700 and 5,200 hectares of arable land, 
respectively, while LPGs and VEGs specializing in animal production were 
housing 1,500 and 2,200 large animals (Großvieheinheiten) on average.60 Sin-
gle fields comprised 200 hectares where the terrain was flat and fertile, and in 
some cases, fields were even double that size.61 As a result of persistent con-
centration, there were only 1,162 LPGs and 78 VEGs left in the GDR in 1989. 
With an average land of 4,500 to 5,000 hectares, they could comprise up to five 
villages.62 
It was not until the 1980s that the productive disadvantages of East German 
agricultural policy became clear. A megalomanic policy had led to oversized 
units with little identification among the employees who had only first-hand 
knowledge in one branch of agriculture. The results were huge losses, most 
prominently in livestock production. Excessive specialization in the form of the 
separation of plant and animal production interrupted the natural nutrition cy-
cles: while feed was lacking in livestock production, plant production had to 
buy mineral fertilizer to increase their yields. Cooperation between both sectors 
remained deficient, manure was distributed only partially and with significant 
losses, while plant production units were hoarding animal feed. In addition, the 
creation of large production units had entailed high investments, and huge 
transaction costs outweighed the economies of scale. Specifically, administra-
tion and supervision turned out to be costly, as did the long distances on the 
LPGs. Finally, specialization drove up costs in the form of services that the 
LPGs had to pay for.  
After reunification, it quickly became clear that the GDR’s agro-industrial 
complexes had by no means an optimal size in economic terms.63 All in all, per-
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acre yields lagged behind West German standards since the 1950s, most 
prominently in the case of sugar beets. Likewise, results in animal production 
(meat per cattle or pig, milk production per cow) were significantly lower than 
those in the Federal Republic. At the same time, the GDR’s agrobusinesses 
employed a much larger workforce than the small and medium-sized family 
farms in West Germany.64 
Agro-industrial production in large units led to severe environmental prob-
lems. However, investigations of these hazards never became public in the 
GDR, and remained an internal affair. In 1978, results of studies conducted by 
the government’s department of the environment and an institute for water-
related issues (Institut für Wasserwirtschaft) instigated a discussion in the Pol-
itburo, resulting in some limited measures for the protection of the environ-
ment. Most prominently, the government sought to shield those areas from 
pollution that served as reservoirs for drinking water.65 In the 1980s, studies of 
the East German Academy of Agricultural Science uncovered significant envi-
ronmental damage resulting from industrialized agricultural production. First, 
concentrated animal production had led to severe pollution of rivers and 
groundwater. Huge quantities of liquid manure were often deposited in highly 
concentrated form on small stretches of land. Even more, storage capacity for 
liquid manure was exceedingly small up to the early 1980s, with the result that 
there was no opportunity to take the condition of the soil or the time of the year 
into consideration when bringing it out. With nitrates ending up in the ground-
water, the results were an eutrophication of lakes and rivers and, in many cases, 
a degradation of the quality of drinking water. The nitrate concentration in 
drinking water increased fivefold from the early 1960s to the early 1980s.66 
Second, pesticides and fertilizers were often applied by planes, which amplified 
the environmental impact. Even the highly poisonous DDT was spread over a 
wide area in this way. Agricultural planes were notoriously imprecise in the 
deposition of their loads, with the result that neighboring areas were likewise 
affected. In the Federal Republic, the use of mineral fertilizer and pesticides 
also took its toll on the environment, but here, civic protest and regulation led 
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to a decrease in the use of such chemicals since the 1960s.67 Third, erosion 
turned out to be a severe problem on large fields, with losses being taxed at 60 
to 80 million Marks by the end of the 1950s. Special plantings could reduce the 
strength of the wind but only served to limit the damage without fully prevent-
ing it.68 Fourth, the use of large machines caused a compression of the soil, in 
some cases to an extreme extent.69 
The East German government revised its program of industrialized agricul-
ture to some extent after Grüneberg’s death on April 19, 1981, the Tenth Party 
Convention in April, 1981, and the Twelth GDR Farmers’ Congress in May, 
1982.70 The size of production units was reduced, if only marginally. Function-
aries also sought to strengthen the producers’ links with the soil and revised the 
organization of work on LPGs accordingly with a reintroduction of the princi-
ple of territoriality (Territorialprinzip). Brigades were no longer in charge of 
special production units but rather of a certain limited area, preferably close to 
the workers’ place of residence.71 Also, a new LPG act of 1982 allowed mem-
bers of these collectives more room for individual farming on separate lots, a 
step that was augmented by the Eleventh Party Convention in April, 1986.72 
Even more, the Politburo decided on October 18, 1983, to move plant and 
animal production closer to each other again by installing cooperative councils 
(Kooperationsräte).73 In the following year, a price reform sought to increase 
agricultural production. Rising prices favored the producers but also increased 
state subsidies, since the government sought to keep consumer prices for basic 
foodstuffs low. With that, subsidies for food increased from 12 to 30.8 billion 
Marks between 1983 and 1986; the price of bread remained so low that it was 
sometimes used as animal feed.74 
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The government also sought to strengthen the Farmers’ Mutual Aid Society 
(Vereinigung der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe) which went back to 1946/47 and 
now regained important social policy functions.75 In doing so, the SED leader-
ship also rescinded its overall goal of creating equal living conditions in city 
and country. From now on, the official line was to emphasize the peculiarities 
of rural life and the intrinsic values of living in the countryside. For example, 
Kurt Krambach, a leading expert on the sociology of agriculture in the GDR, 
argued for 
a recreation of rural traditions, experiences, and customs like the legendary 
industriousness of the peasants, the close bonds with animals and the soil, 
their economizing and their careful use of common property as important 
components of the productive skills and socialist behavior and way of thinking 
of peasants in a collective.76 
With demands for “making the village a home for peasants in a collective” and 
the mobilization of the “progressive historical traditions of rural life in vil-
lages,” the SED agricultural policy effectively abandoned its one-sided orienta-
tion towards models of industrialization and urbanization. In the 1980s, the 
government even arranged for the reconstruction of old farm houses in order to 
strengthen local identities. In doing so, the leading functionaries tacitly ac-
knowledged the failure of their agricultural and social policy.77 
As it turned out, evoking “good peasant experiences and traditions” for the 
productive good of large-scale agricultural production did not stop the general 
decline of farming in the GDR.78 The trade deficit necessitated the sale of agri-
cultural machinery made in the GDR. As a result, usage circles of machinery in 
East German agriculture grew longer and longer. In spite of careful corrections, 
the SED’s agricultural policy drew a contradictory picture during the 1980s. 
For example, “progress of science and technology” remained an important ide-
al that was rescinded only partially.79 Also, the dominance of large enterprises 
in the GDR remained generally unchanged. In 1989, 3,800 LPGs and 465 
VEGs were cultivating 87 and 7 percent, respectively, of the GDR’s total ar-
able land. Collective and state farms for plant production (LPG[P] and VEG 
[P] in the GDR’s system of acronyms) held 4,500 hectares of land on average, 
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and LPGs for animal production (LPG[T]) comprised some 1,800 large animals 
(Großvieheinheiten) each.80 In 1990, the GDR’s largest farm for pig mast 
closed its doors in Mecklenburg: it had offered space for more than 100,000 
animals.81 
In the 1980s, the government finally took steps to reduce the environmental 
consequences of industrialized farm production. For example, it planted rows 
of trees in order to reduce wind erosion on large fields. Mineral fertilizer use 
decreased, and the construction of storage tanks for liquid manure reduced the 
pollution of the groundwater. Also, the increasing use of special machinery for 
loosening the lower strata of the soil reduced the compression hazards.82 How-
ever, the overall environmental impact remained high, and in fact led to the 
formation of opposition groups. Protest erupted with the collapse of the SED’s 
regime in the fall of 1989. For example, citizens in Thuringia revolted against a 
huge combine for pig production near Neustadt/Orla that comprised some 
175,000 animals, most of them for export to the Federal Republic. The com-
bine dumped its liquid manure in 16 open ponds located on the site of a former 
forest of a size of 130 hectares. During the 1980s, an environmental opposition 
group had formed in the nearby villages under the auspices of the church.83 
Generally speaking, the political goal of “industrial production methods” in 
East German agriculture led to important transformations of both agricultural 
production and rural society. However, the giantism of the SED’s agricultural 
policy turned out to be economically dysfunctional. Even more, the transition 
towards industrial modes of production caused severe environmental problems 
that the government for the most part ignored up to the 1980s. At the same 
time, environmental opposition groups grew since the late 1970s but suffered 
from a limited range of action. A “Society for Nature and the Environment” 
(Gesellschaft für Natur und Umwelt) formed in 1980 upon the initiative of the 
SED leadership with the goal of binding friends of nature to the regime. How-
ever, independent seminars and local initiatives, like the nationwide study-
group “alternatives within agriculture” (Arbeitskreis „Alternativen in der Land-
wirtschaft“) with the church-owned educational establishment Kirchliches For-
schungsheim Wittenberg, took a strong stand against agro-industrial production 
in large-scale units. The Ministerium für Staatssicherheit was able to obstruct 
an experimental project of the study-group but could not prevent the formation 
of a league for organic farming (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Ökologischen Land-
bau „Gäa“) with an ecological study-group of the Dresden church district 
(Ökologischer Arbeitskreis der Dresdner Kirchenbezirke). In 1990, this group 
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gave birth to a formal association of the same name that still organizes organic 
farmers in the new states of unified Germany.84 
5. Industrialized Agriculture and the Natural Environment 
in the Federal Republic of Germany since the 1960s 
In essence, the GDR’s megalomanic agricultural policy was a radical version of 
a general trend that occurred, in different degrees, in all industrial societies 
after the Second World War. The following remarks sketch the move towards 
industrialized agriculture in the Federal Republic of Germany in order to iden-
tify general characteristics and the specifics of the GDR’s agro-industrial com-
plexes. 
Up to the 1960s, the overarching goal of agricultural policy in West Ger-
many was a secure supply of cheap food. However, the production principle 
gradually gave way to the goal of profitability since the mid-1950s. In spite of 
the EEC’s protectionist farm policy, market forces, together with a rapid exo-
dus of workers, pushed the farmers to increase per-acre yields and productivity 
by means of a rapid mechanization, intensification and rationalization of agri-
cultural production. As a result, capital investments per workplace in agricul-
ture exceeded industrial figures by the 1970s.85 Political measures supported 
horizontal cooperation between farms in the form of collective machinery use 
and special subcontractors.86 However, none of these measures fundamentally 
challenged the farm owners’ freedom of decision and operation, in contrast to 
collectivization in the GDR. 
As in the East German state, agriculture increasingly linked up with related 
branches and food processing in the Federal Republic, especially in animal 
production. In some cases, even commercial enterprises took the initiative to 
set up units for chicken or cattle mast or egg production, which lead to large, 
specialized agro-industrial complexes. The creation of these production units 
mirrored a general trend towards a separation of animal and plant production, 
most prominently in the northwestern part of Germany around the cities of Ol-
denburg, Cloppenburg, and Vechta. In the 1980s, measurements showed exces-
sive loads of nitrogen in the soil, due mostly to large deposits of mineral fertil-
izer and liquid manure.87 All in all, the general trend was towards larger stocks 
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of animals. For example, the average size of pig stocks on West German farms 
grew threefold between 1971 and 1988.88 At the same time, the farmers’ de-
pendence on other branches grew considerably. Previously independent farm-
ers became contract workers, with a salary depending on production and profit. 
A concentration on livestock breeding often went at the expense of the envi-
ronment since many businesses lacked the necessary land for a proper deposi-
tion of the animals’ manure. In addition to groundwater pollution, air pollution 
from mast units and chicken farms became a problem. 
In plant production, vertical integration remained limited. In order to in-
crease productivity, farmers used pesticides, herbicides and fungicides on fields 
of ever-growing size. The average deposit of nitrogen per hectare rose from 
25.6 kilogram during the 1950/51 agricultural season to 79.7 kilogram in 
1967/70, while the phosphorus deposit doubled during these two decades.89 In 
the late 1960s, West German farmers spent some 400 million DM annually for 
17,000 tons of pesticides.90 The ensuing burden for the environment, especially 
in the form of erosion and eutrophication of surface waters, was significant but 
tended to decrease since the 1970s as a result of effective state supervision. Al-
so, farmers were using pesticides and fertilizers more carefully now, resulting 
in reductions of total amounts.91 During the 1980s, a public debate arose in 
West Germany over the consequences of industrialized agriculture and the 
production of more healthy food.92 Organic farming grew significantly in the 
wake of these discussions, with 32 percent of the land cultivated in this manner 
by 1989/90 lying in Bavaria.93 
In comparative perspective, it becomes clear that the transformation of agri-
culture in the GDR was more radical and far-reaching than in the Federal Re-
public. In West Germany, the importance of agriculture shrunk considerably, 
but agricultural production did not lose its privileged role as a heavily subsi-
dized part of the economy. However, more than a million farms ceased produc-
tion between 1960 and 1990, in addition to a widespread move towards part-
time farming. Many of those who gave up production remained proprietors of 
their arable land. Rent, not sale, of agricultural land was typical of the trans-
formation of farming in the Federal Republic.94 Finally, the transformation was 
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cushioned through a comprehensive welfare policy. In contrast, the East Ger-
man government forced the transformation of agriculture in several stages, and 
discussions over environmental issues remained muted in the GDR for lack of 
an unrestricted public sphere. 
In all probability, West German agriculture will lose its privileged position 
in the foreseeable future. The agrobusiness complex is likely to grow, continu-
ing the current trend towards efficient farms with high productive capacity, and 
biotechnological advances will presumably nourish this general development. 
Growing control efforts will be indispensable in order to curb the environ-
mental impact of large agricultural production units. However, producers will 
face not only a public discussion of their environmental toll but also an increas-
ing consumer demand for more healthy food.95 
6. Conclusion: Two Paths of Modernizing Agriculture 
and their Environmental Impact 
As a result of collectivization in the GDR, the family farm persisted as the 
West German model of agricultural policy until the collapse of the SED’s re-
gime and the reunification of Germany, regardless of the structural changes 
within agriculture. In fact, the family farm even played a role in the debate of 
the transformation of East German agriculture after reunification.96 However, 
this concept turned out to be elusive, not least because the East German model 
of forced modernization drew on structural and cultural traditions from the pre-
war era. Though important trends of agricultural modernization were remarka-
bly similar in both German states, the paths of development differed considera-
bly. 
In 1989, East German agriculture was far more labor-intensive than its 
Western counterpart. The general task of the LPGs was to secure a cheap food 
supply for the East German population. With that, the East German agricultural 
policy adhered to the production principle as opposed to the productivity prin-
ciple. Due in part to mandatory social services within collectives, East German 
agricultural businesses comprised a much larger number of workers until 
1989/90 than those in the Federal Republic. As late as 1985, 11 percent of the 
GDR’s workforce was employed in the agricultural sector. In West Germany, 
the secular trend from the primary sector towards the industrial and service 
economy was significantly faster – truly a paradox in the light of the radical 
modernist ideals of the SED leadership.97 
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However, there were also qualitative differences between the developments 
of agriculture in the two German states. In the Federal Republic, farmers were 
operating under the pressure of market prices due to international competition. 
As a result, the principle of profitability took the place of the production prin-
ciple since the 1950s. Also, West German agricultural policy never infringed 
the farmers’ property rights. In contrast, East German farmers lost command 
over their property when they entered the LPGs. In spite of bitter disputes over 
the property of collectives and questions of restitution, it is noteworthy that the 
GDR’s collectives developed bonds with their members that persisted even 
after the peaceful revolution of 1989/90.98 However, generational change and 
lack of capital, land, and knowledge prevented a recreation of a peasant-based 
agriculture in East Germany after 1990.99 As a result, the successors of the 
LPGs still claim a large part of East Germany’s arable land.100 In West Germa-
ny, “classic modernity” gave way to “reflexive modernity” in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, with important consequences for agriculture as well.101 In con-
trast, East German leaders generally ignored the ambivalence of agricultural 
modernization. As in so many fields, the SED regime’s ability to learn and cor-
rect previous mistakes turned out to be limited.102 
The environmental consequences of industrialized agricultural production 
became apparent in both German states in the 1970s. Conditions in the Federal 
Republic allowed open criticism of these problems, while the GDR sought to 
suppress public discussions on the environmental hazards of industrial agricul-
ture. Protest and study-groups remained singular and isolated, usually under the 
protection of the protestant church. After the collapse of SED rule, these groups 
voiced an open critique of agro-industrial production, leading to the foundation 
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of the organic farming group Anbauverbandes für Ökologischen Landbau 
„Gäa.”103 In West Germany, the environmental movement likewise criticized 
the impact of industrialized agriculture on nature, though protest against nu-
clear power plants claimed the lion’s share of attention in the 1980s. After 
reunification, modernist conceptions of agriculture are on the defensive in all of 
Germany. Having reached the end of ambitious illusions on the creative powers 
of man with regard to agriculture, it is now time to write their history. 
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